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Abstract 
 
Using children's naive theory of biology as a framework, this study examined children's illness 
conceptions. Children (aged 4-11), presented with one of four exemplars (child, dog, duck or 
rosebush) suffering an imaginary illness, were asked whether various entities from six 
categories, biological and non-biological, could also be afflicted. The children’s illness 
generalisations differentiated between all of the categories; they not only distinguished 
between living and non-living things, but also recognised biological subkinds. Furthermore, 
the children's generalisations were significantly greater to the category of exemplar, indicating 
that human prototypicality is not the sole basis for children’s generalisations. It is concluded 
that children’s understanding of illness is mediated by a naïve biological theory which 
facilitates their systematic predictions of susceptibility to illness. 
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Introduction 
 
In recent years, a growing dissatisfaction with the Piagetian approach to children’s cognitive-
development has led to increasing interest in the ‘theory’ approach. The latter approach 
postulates that children acquire content-specific (rather than domain-general) systems of 
knowledge, about which they reason using naïve theories in order to make predictions. Three 
particular knowledge domains have been investigated, namely physics, psychology and 
biology (Wellman & Gelman, 1992, 1998). According to Wellman (1990), a theory requires 
ontological distinctions, coherence and a causal-explanatory framework. Following 
Wellman’s general framework, Hatano and Inagaki (1994) propose that there are three 
important components involved in biological thinking: 1) knowledge to ascertain the specific 
entities which fall within the biological domain; that is the distinction between the living and 
the non-living; 2) a mode of inference which permits integrated and reasonable predictions for 
attributes or behaviours of biological entities; and 3) a non-intentional causal explanatory 
framework for the behaviours relevant to biological processes.  
     Examination of young children’s biological thinking has become the subject of intensive 
interest in recent years and research suggests that children do have access to a naïve theory of 
biology. It is apparent that children do develop an ontology of biological kinds and that they 
hold biologically specific causal beliefs about those ontological members, although their 
framework understandings about biology differ substantially from those of adults (Carey, 
1985; Richards & Siegler, 1986; Springer & Keil, 1989, 1991; Springer, 1992, 1996; Wellman 
& Gellman, 1992, 1998; Hatano & Inagaki, 1994; Inagaki & Hatano, 1996; Keil, 1992).  
     Thus within a ‘theory’ approach, the child is portrayed as a ‘theorist’ (Rosser, 1994) who is 
capable of forming and using complex mental structures that function as explanatory systems. 
However, the approximate age at which such a theoretical understanding of biology emerges 
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is yet to be clarified. Carey believes that children have a fairly limited ability to reason about 
biological systems until their developing knowledge, in conjunction with some structural 
change, results in the emergence of biological understanding around the age of 6 or 7, building 
on an earlier intuitive psychology (1995). On the other hand, Keil (1989, 1992) attributes 
much greater ability in reasoning biologically to young children, arguing that they may still 
hold a rudimentary understanding of biological systems, even though they lack specific 
knowledge of those systems. Inagaki and Hatano (1996) also believe that children acquire an 
autonomous domain of biology at a young age, around the age of 5-6 years, as by this age 
children appear to recognise commonalities across the ontological categories of humans, 
animals and plants.  
     Research has examined some of the various events, processes and categories which must 
form part of biological understanding. One particular aspect of children’s thinking which has 
been the subject of sustained interest has been the children’s acquisition of a biological 
taxonomy. Not only do children require an awareness of the living/non-living dichotomy, but 
also, for an integrated theory of biology, they need to expand their thinking to encompass the 
full range of various biological categories, such as humans, animals and plants.  
     According to Carey (1995), young children’s understanding is based upon humans as the 
prototypical biological entity. She believes that young children, under the age of about 10, 
then extend their thinking to other biological categories according to the similarity or 
proximity of other entities to humans. For example, when taught on a human exemplar, 
children not only tend to generalise more to other ontological categories but the likelihood of 
such generalisations is greater the closer the links between the human exemplar and the other 
entities (Carey, 1995).  
     Children’s early understanding of the biological category of human is assisted by children’s 
inevitable involvement with issues concerning their own bodies and health (Inagaki and 
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Hatano, 1993). However, for a fully autonomous theory of biology, children require an 
understanding of the other ‘living’ categories, such as animals and plants, and of the 
commonalities between them. Research suggests that children may achieve this understanding 
through reference to some salient distinctive attribute or process. For example, Backscheider, 
Shatz and Gelman (1993) found that 4-year-olds recognise that both animals and plants can 
regrow if injured, while artifacts require human assistance. Inagaki and Hatano (1996) found 
that children as young as 5 or 6 years of age were aware of certain commonalities between 
animals and plants, such as the need for food/water and the ability to grow in size, and duly 
differentiated the animals and plants from the inanimate objects on those aspects. In fact, 
Inagaki and Hatano (1996) suggest that these particular properties of growth and taking 
food/water are essential for children’s recognition of the living/non-living distinction 
     However, the biological status of plants appears to be more problematical than that of 
animals and some research has revealed children’s thinking about plants to be less integrated. 
Slaughter, Jaakkola  and Carey (1999),  examining the concept of death in children aged 4-6, 
found that the children had a good understanding of death affecting humans and animals, but 
that only a minority (24%) believed that plants would die. Hatano, Siegler, Richards, Inagaki, 
Stavy and Wax (1993) investigated the thinking of young American, Israeli and Japanese 
children (5-10 year-olds) about various biological attributes and processes in humans, 
animals, plants and inanimate objects. The children were most accurate about humans, less 
accurate about animals and inanimate objects, and least accurate about plants. It would 
therefore appear that young children’s thinking about plants may lag behind their 
comprehension of the animal and human categories, depending on the biological processes or 
attributes under examination. 
     Drawing upon this theoretical background, the present study aimed to explore children’s 
understanding of illness. While most research examining children’s thinking about illness has 
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used a Piagetian framework (e.g. Bibace & Walsh, 1981; Perrin & Gerrity, 1981; Rubovits & 
Siegel, 1994) there have been a few studies conducted from a ‘theory’ perspective. These 
studies have found that pre-school children have well-developed theories about the ways 
certain kinds of illnesses are transmitted, including a cold (Siegal, 1988; Inagaki, 1997).  
Siegelman, Maddock, Epstein and Carpenter (1993) investigated children’s understanding of 
the risk factors involved in catching AIDS, colds and cancer, revealing that children were 
generally knowledgeable about risk factors but not as competent in rejection of non-risk 
factors. Furthermore, some studies within a ‘theory’ perspective have indicated that children’s 
acquisition of an understanding of illness across the biological domain may be problematical 
with reference to the plant category. Inagaki and Hatano (1996) examined 5-year-old 
children’s generalization of illness from humans to other biological and non-biological entities 
and found that children were less likely to generalise to plants than to animals. Finney and 
Taplin (1998) looked at children’s generalisations of a germ-based illness to biological and 
non-biological entities in children aged 5-10. They found very low attributions to plants at all 
ages and suggested that young children do not include all living kinds in their understanding 
of the transmission of germ-based illnesses. 
     However, all these studies which have examined children’s understanding of illness using 
the naïve theory approach have presented the children with known diseases, thus focusing on 
their acquired knowledge as opposed to their conceptual reasoning about illness.  An 
investigation of children’s understanding of illness, using an hypothetical disease as opposed 
to a cold or other ‘real’ illnesses, should reveal something of their naive theory of illness.  
     The present study examined children’s understanding of ontological categories in relation 
to illness, using Keil’s (1989) work as a theoretical perspective. He investigated children’s 
ontological knowledge by exploring their understanding of ontological boundaries through 
transformations (e.g. whether it was possible to turn a horse into a zebra, or a cactus into a 
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porcupine).  He revealed that children do have an intuitive taxonomy for structuring the 
biological domain and that they resist impossible biological transformations while accepting 
others as more plausible.  Therefore, using Keil’s general approach, this present study 
examined children’s understanding of 6 ontological categories (humans, mammals, non-
mammals, birds, plants and hand-made artefacts) exploring their ontological boundaries for 
illness by an examination of their predictions about which entities could or could not get ill.   
     There were three major points of difference from previous studies in this area. First, in 
order to test Carey’s belief that children regard humans as the prototypical biological entity, 
the study examined children’s generalisations of illness from three non-human exemplars 
(mammal, bird and plant) in addition to a human exemplar. The inclusion of a plant exemplar 
would also permit a direct examination of the status of plants as a biological category in 
children’s thinking. Furthermore, previous studies have generally used a human exemplar, if 
any exemplar was used. Secondly, the children were asked about which entities could or could 
not get ‘plinkitis’, a made-up illness, in order to give them the opportunity to use their naive 
theories of illness.  As plinkitis is not a real disease, the children were unable to draw upon 
any specific acquired knowledge about this particular disease, but were forced to use their 
naive or implicit theories of illness in order to generalise to biological and non-biological 
entities. Finally, in order to avoid the problems associated with open-ended interviewing of 
children (i.e. problems caused by children’s inability to access and/or verbally express their 
own knowledge), the children’s ontological boundaries were tested by card-sorting tasks.  
     It was expected that the children would indeed reveal a grasp of biological distinctions in 
their understanding of illness, but that they would be less likely to generalise illness to the 
non-biological entities, i.e. hand-made artifacts, thus revealing a comprehension of the 
distinction between the living and the non-living (Carey, 1985; Keil 1989; Hatano & 
Inagaki,1994). It was also predicted that the children’s understanding of illness would be 
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based primarily on humans and then extended to other biological categories on the basis of the 
similarity or proximity between the human and non-human entities (mammals, non-mammals, 
birds and plants) (Carey 1985). It was further proposed that the use of non-human exemplars 
would result in a lower degree of generalisation (Carey, 1985; Inagaki & Hatano, 1991, 
Hatano & Inagaki, 1999). It was also expected that the children would report lower levels of 
generalisation to plants than to other biological categories. Finally, it was expected that the 
children’s responses would reveal a developing biological understanding, as children gain 
both in knowledge and theoretical comprehension with age. Furthermore, any such 
developmental differences might indicate the age at which children exhibit a naïve theory of 
biology, either supporting Keil’s belief (1989) that very young children do display some 
theoretically-based thinking about biological systems or Carey’s view (1995) that very young 
children’s understanding in this area is very limited.  
 
 
Method 
 
Sample 
 
A total of 280 children were randomly recruited from school years Reception to Year 6 (age 
range: 4.8-11.6 years) from schools in south-east England.  The children were grouped into 
three age-groups for the purpose of analysis: 1) Young Group containing 120 children from 
school years Reception, 1 and 2 (64 girls: mean age = 6.2 years, age range = 4.8-7.7 years; 56 
boys: mean age = 6.2 years, age range = 4.8-7.8 years); 2) Middle Group containing 80 
children from school years 3 and 4 (35 girls: mean age = 8.8 years, age range = 7.8-9.7 years; 
45 boys: mean age = 8.7 years, age range = 7.8-9.7 years);  3) Old Group containing 80 
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children from school years 5 and 6 (38 girls: mean age = 10.6 years , age range = 9.9-11.6 
years; 42 boys: mean age = 10.8 years, age range = 9.9-11.6 years). 
 
 
Materials 
 
Thirty cards, each measuring 5 x 2.5 ins., naming five entities from each of six ontological 
categories, were used in each of three sorting tasks.  On each card, the name of one entity was 
printed clearly.  The ontological categories from which the entity names were drawn were (a) 
human beings (man, woman, boy, girl, baby), (b) mammals (elephant, cow, sheep, cat, 
mouse), (c) non-mammals (crocodile, tortoise, frog, butterfly, ant), (d) birds (turkey, swan, 
chicken, blackbird, robin), (e) plants (oak tree, apple tree, daisy, daffodil, sunflower), and (f) 
hand-made artifacts (house, car, bicycle, computer, cup).  There were three boxes, measuring 
9 x 6.5 x 7 ins., representing one of the three possible answers given by the children. Each of 
the three boxes was labelled with the appropriate words, which were clearly printed on the 
front: can get plinkitis, cannot get plinkitis, I don’t know. Finally, four cards were used, each 
showing a simple black and white line drawing of one of the exemplars in reference to which 
children were taught about the imaginary illness. The four exemplars used were a child, a dog, 
a duck and a rosebush, belonging to the categories of human beings, mammals, birds and 
plants respectively. The exemplars were chosen from the midpoint size of each range 
(midpoint size of humans, mammals, birds and plants respectively) in order to minimise the 
effect of possible biases which might limit children’s generalisations based upon the size of 
exemplars.  
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Procedure 
 
Children were randomly assigned to either the child, dog, duck or rosebush condition. The 
children were all interviewed singly and were told that the purpose of the interview was to 
assist the interviewer in writing a book for children concerning the body. The children were 
assured that there were no right or wrong answers and that they should ask for clarification if 
they found any question difficult to understand. The three boxes with open tops without lids 
were put on the table.  Each box represented one of the possible answers which could be given 
by the child: can get plinkitis, cannot get plinkitis, I don’t know.  The boxes were placed on 
the table in the above order for the first child and in such a way that the child could clearly see 
what was written on each box.  For the second child the order cannot get plinkitis, can get 
plinkitis, I don’t know was used.  These two orders were alternated accordingly throughout the 
testing in order to control for possible left-right response biases.  The interviewer showed the 
cards to the child, in a different randomised order for each individual child. The child was told 
that the task was to place each card into one of the boxes depending on whether he/she 
thought that the entity named on each card can get plinkitis, cannot get plinkitis or that he/she 
did not know. For the younger children, cards were read in case there were any difficulties 
with reading.  The exact words used by the interviewer were as follows: 
 
Have you ever heard of plinkitis? Plinkitis is an illness.  Here is a picture of a child 
(dog, duck or rosebush; depending on which exemplar the child was taught on).  
Children (dogs, ducks or rosebushes) can get plinkitis.  When children (dogs, ducks or 
rosebushes) get plinkitis they go a funny colour and they get spots.  They also go very 
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floppy and weak. Here are some cards with the names of lots of different things on 
them.  What I would like you to do is put each card into one of these boxes, depending 
on whether you think that thing can get plinkitis or cannot get plinkitis.  For example, 
if you think that something can get plinkitis, put the card into the box which says ‘can 
get plinkitis’ (physically hold a card over the box).  If you think that something cannot 
get plinkitis, put the card into the box that says ‘cannot get plinkitis’ (physically hold a 
card over the second box).  If you really don’t know whether it can get plinkitis or 
cannot get plinkitis, put the card in the ‘don’t know box’ (physically hold a card over 
the ‘don’t know box)”.  For the younger children the following words were added: ‘if 
you have any difficulty reading some of the cards, tell me and I’ll help you to read 
them. 
 
 
Results 
 
The results are presented in the following order: (1) Children’s illness generalisations: 
ANOVAS were conducted on the children’s basic scores (the number of entities, out of five, 
chosen as susceptible to plinkitis) within each of the 6 ontological categories, in order to 
examine the children’s thinking about the categories; (2) Patterns of generalisations: 
Configural Frequency Analysis (CFA) was conducted to explore any variations in the 
children’s response patterns according to the exemplar on which they were taught. 
Additionally, log linear analyses were conducted to investigate any possible links between 
children’s response patterns and their age or gender. 
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Children’s Illness Generalisations 
 
The total number of cards from within each ontological category, which were placed into each 
individual box, was calculated: in each case, the scores could therefore range from 0-5. The 
mean scores obtained by the children in each age-group were first analysed using 4-way  
3 (age) x 2 (gender) x 4 (exemplar) x 6 (type of ontological category) mixed ANOVAS with 
independent groups on the first three factors and repeated measures on the fourth factor. These  
revealed numerous main and interaction effects (involving age, exemplar and category) on all 
three responses (can get plinkitis, cannot get plinkitis, I don’t know). However, as these 
results were complex to interpret, the data were also analysed for each exemplar separately 
using four separate 3 (age) x 2 (gender) x 6 (ontological category) mixed ANOVAs, with 
independent groups on the first two factors and repeated measures on the third factor. These 
revealed main effects of type of category on all three responses (can get plinkitis, cannot get 
plinkitis, I don’t know) with all four exemplars, suggesting that children do perceive 
differences between the various categories of entities when exemplars belong to different 
ontological categories. As the children’s category inclusion responses (i.e. those entities which 
can get plinkitis) provide the clearest indications of their thinking, the present report will be 
confined to the analyses of these responses. The children’s mean scores in  response to the 
question, who can get plinkitis, are shown in Tables 1-4 and the results of the relevant 
ANOVA are also shown in these Tables. Scheffe tests were conducted to locate the effects 
involving age (see footnotes to Tables 3 and 4) and post hoc t-tests were conducted to locate 
the effects involving category (see Table 5). 
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*  *  INSERT TABLES 1-5 ABOUT HERE  *  * 
 
Differences associated with ontological category 
 
Child Exemplar. When the children were taught the imaginary illness (plinkitis) on the child 
exemplar, they claimed that humans were significantly more likely than all the other 
categories to get plinkitis (see Tables 1 and 5).  After human beings, mammals were the most 
likely followed by birds, non-mammals, plants and hand-made artifacts in that order.  
However, the difference between birds and non-mammals was not significant.  The category 
of hand-made artifacts was seen by all children as significantly the least likely to get plinkitis.   
 
 
Dog Exemplar. When the children were taught that plinkitis is an illness afflicting dogs, they 
claimed that mammals were significantly more likely than all the other categories to get 
plinkitis (see Tables 2 and 5).  After mammals they judged birds as most likely to get plinkitis, 
followed by humans, non-mammals, plants and hand-made artifacts in that order.  It was again 
the category of hand-made artifacts which was seen by all children as significantly the least 
likely to get plinkitis.  However, the differences humans and non-mammals, between humans 
and birds, between non-mammals and birds, and between plants and artifacts were not 
significant. 
 
 
Duck Exemplar. When the children were taught that plinkitis is an illness afflicting ducks, 
they rated birds to be significantly more likely to get plinkitis than the other ontological 
groups (see Tables 3 and 5).  After birds, mammals were the most likely to get plinkitis, 
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followed by non-mammals, and humans, and then plants.  The category of hand-made artifacts 
was seen by all children as significantly the least likely to get plinkitis.  However, the 
differences between humans and mammals, between humans and non-mammals and between 
mammals and non-mammals were not significant. 
 
 
Rosebush Exemplar. When the children were taught that plinkitis is an illness afflicting 
rosebushes they claimed that plants were significantly more likely than all the other categories 
to get plinkitis (see Tables 4 and 5).  After plants they rated humans as more likely to get 
plinkitis followed by mammals and birds together, followed by non-mammals and hand-made 
artifacts.  However, the differences between humans and mammals, humans and non-
mammals, and humans and birds were not significant.  Additionally, the differences between 
mammals and non-mammals, mammals and birds and non-mammals and birds were not 
significant. 
 
 
Differences associated with age 
 
There were no main or interaction effects involving age for both the child and dog exemplars.  
However, children taught on the duck and rosebush exemplars exhibited significant age x 
category interaction effects.  Post hoc analysis revealed that the age differences for the duck 
exemplar occurred only in the category of birds (see Table 3), where the Young group 
generalized significantly less to birds than either the Middle or the Old group. 
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     When children were taught on the rosebush exemplar, the post hoc analyses revealed that 
there were only significant age differences in the category of plants (see Table 4), with the Old 
group generalizing significantly more to plants than either the Young or Middle group.  
 
 
Response patterns 
 
In addition to the age and category differences identified in the ANOVAS, it was evident that 
different children presented different response patterns overall about the susceptibility to 
illness of entities belonging to different ontological categories and according to exemplar. In 
order to explore these variations, Configural Frequency Analysis (CFA) was used. This form 
of non-parametric, multivariate analysis of association identifies response patterns which are 
over-represented (types) and under-represented (anti-types) given the null hypothesis that 
these patterns are normally and randomly distributed  (Krauth, 1985; Von Eye, 1990).  
Focusing on the children’s choices of those entities which can get ill, the children’s responses 
for each category were scored as follows: to those children who chose two or less entities in a 
category (i.e. a minority of entities) a score of 0 was given; to those children who chose three 
or more entities in a category (i.e. a majority of entities) a score of 1 was given.  Therefore, 
each child had a score of 0 or 1 for each ontological category and the resulting response 
pattern for each participant could be characterised as a sequence of 0s and 1s, with the six 
categories being represented in the following order: humans, mammals, non-mammals, birds, 
plants and hand-made artifacts.  For example, the response pattern 111000 was given to a 
child who chose three or more entities from the ontological categories of humans, mammals 
and non-mammals and two or less entities from the ontological categories of  birds, plants and 
hand-made artifacts. The data thus generated were subjected to four CFAs, one for each of the 
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four exemplars, child, dog, duck and rosebush. The results are displayed  in Table 6, which 
shows there were three patterns for the child exemplar, five for the dog exemplar, seven for 
the duck exemplar and four for the rosebush exemplar, all of which occurred significantly 
more frequently than would be expected by chance. 
 
*   *   INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE  *  * 
 
In order to investigate any associations between the children’s response patterns and age or 
gender, a new variable was computed corresponding to whether or not each child presented 
each of the significant response judgement patterns.  A series of hierarchical log linear 
analyses was conducted to assess whether each individual response pattern was significantly 
associated with either age or gender. No significant associations were found. 
 
 
Discussion 
 
This study set out to examine children’s understanding of illness, using their naïve theory of 
biology as a framework theory. Overall, the children’s assessments of susceptibility to a 
hypothetical illness displayed an awareness of the distinctiveness of the ontological 
categories. Depending on the exemplar used, the children’s thinking revealed discontinuities 
between every pair of categories in at least one condition (see Table 5).  
As these differences were not age-related, this supports the view that children do possess an 
early grasp of biological distinctions (Keil, 1992; Inagaki & Hatano, 1996).  
     Furthermore, there was a paucity of any interactions with age in the study. There were 
minimal differences in the generalisations from the duck and rosebush exemplars, but overall, 
the children’s differentiation of the ontological categories did not vary across the age-range 
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tested. Furthermore, the significant response patterns identified by the CFAs were not 
associated with particular ages. All of these findings are further support for children’s early 
acquisition of a naïve theory of biology (Keil, 1992; Inagaki & Hatano, 1996). 
 
 
Human prototypicality 
 
Carey (1985) proposed that humans represent the prototypical biological entity for children 
and that children accordingly base all their biological attributions on their assessments of 
proximity and/or similarity between humans and any other biological entity. In this study, the 
children taught on the human exemplar duly generalised most to humans, then mammals, 
birds, non-mammals, plants and hand-made artifacts in that order. However, other findings 
did not support Carey’s claim of human prototypicality in young children’s biological 
understanding.  
     For all three non-human exemplars, the dog, duck and rosebush, the approach was the 
same as for the human exemplar: the children generalised most to the category of the 
exemplar on which they had been taught. Carey’s claim, that children will hold to the human 
prototype even when exposed to non-human exemplars, is based on her belief that young 
children have not yet acquired an understanding of the full range of biological categories. 
Therefore, the readiness of the children in this study to generalise as much from the non-
human exemplars as from the human one, is further support for the view that children acquire 
an early understanding of the distinctiveness of biological categories (Keil,1992; Inagaki & 
Hatano,1996) .  
     In addition, there were no differences associated with age in the children’s generalisations 
from the child exemplar. If young children do base their generalisations on human 
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prototypicality to a greater extent than older children, then it would be expected that the 
younger children would generalise more from the child exemplar than the older children. 
Therefore, in the absence of any significant differences in the children’s generalisations, the 
results do not support Carey’s claim for human prototypicality. 
 
 
Biological status of plants 
 
With respect to the biological status of plants, there was mixed evidence in the children’s 
responses. The children did generalise the illness less to hand-made artifacts than to plants, 
except in one condition (dog exemplar), thus supporting the view that they had acquired an 
understanding of the distinction between living and non-living entities (Inagaki & Hatano, 
1996). Furthermore, when taught on the rosebush exemplar, they weighted their 
generalisations heavily in favour of the same category (i.e. plants), just as they did for all the 
other exemplars. On the other hand, when taught on any of the exemplars other than the 
rosebush, the children generalised least to plants out of the five biological categories and the 
level of their generalisations to plants was very low overall, suggesting that they construed 
plants as being very different kinds of biological entities from animals.  
     These differences in the way in which the children treated plants may have occurred for a 
number of reasons. First, the use of an unknown illness may have forced the children to resort 
to their core beliefs about illness, and in particular to a model of illness based on infection or 
contagion, which has been seen as the prototypical illness for young children (Kalish, 1999). 
If the children were indeed dependent on this model, then they would have been forced to 
consider the methods for transmission of infection between plants and other categories. Since 
much of their understanding of contagion depends on proximity, children may well have 
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concluded that the opportunities for close contact with plants were more limited for both 
humans and animals than the possible contacts between humans and animals. Therefore, these 
practical considerations may have reduced the level of generalisations regardless of the 
children’s understanding of the biological status of plants.  
     Secondly, children may hold specific beliefs about illnesses in plants. They may, for 
example, believe that illnesses affecting plants are more restrictive throughout the biological 
system, while those affecting humans and animals are more widespread in their scope. On the 
other hand, they may not have been aware that plants could get ill, unless expressly instructed 
by the adult researcher to the converse, as was the case with the rosebush exemplar.  
     Thirdly, there may have been linguistic considerations influencing the children’s 
generalisations. Although the illness description was phrased carefully so as to be applicable 
to all biological categories, the children may have judged it as more appropriate to human and 
animal categories than to plants. In particular, the actual use of the word ‘illness’, though the 
most suitable term for both humans and animals, and one readily understood and used by the 
children themselves, nevertheless may have confused the issue, as plants are generally 
described in the English language as having a disease rather than an illness.  
     Fourthly, previous research has revealed that young children do include plants in their 
biological thinking when questioned about certain other biological processes or events, such 
as life status (Hatano et al., 1993), the ability to regrow after injury (Backscheider et al., 
1993), the need for food/water and the ability to grow in size (Inagaki & Hatano, 1996). 
However, these particular biological aspects are all relatively easy to observe in plants by 
children, particularly by those who have the opportunity to play in gardens or parks. By the 
time they enter school, most young children should have had the chance to acquire the 
knowledge that plants are living entities, that they need water, increase in size and can repair 
spontaneously after injury, by simple observation. Furthermore, it is with respect to these 
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particular biological aspects that children demonstrate an autonomous theory of biology, 
which they extend to plants. On the other hand, in the case of illness, as Finney and Taplin 
found (1998), children tend not to generalise illness to plants when asked about the effects of 
illness-producing germs. This may reflect the fact that, not only is illness in plants a more 
uncommon phenomenon than simple growth and care aspects, but illness in any biological 
entity, other than human, may be an unusual experience for children. Therefore, it may be that 
the children’s responses do not necessarily indicate a less mature comprehension of the 
category of living entities but may be a consequence of insufficient experience or knowledge 
of plants.  
     Finally, the children’s perceived discontinuity between plants and animals could simply  
suggest a sophisticated grasp of their differences. If this is the case, such sophisticated 
understanding would appear to be present at a very early age. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, the children revealed a basic understanding of the distinctiveness of the 
different ontological categories through their generalisations of illness and, furthermore, this 
understanding did not appear to change substantially with age. However, human 
prototypicality was not the only basis for their judgements as they generalised from all the 
non-human exemplars most to entities within the same category. As for the status of plants, 
there was some evidence that the children did perceive plants as a separate biological 
category.  However, their tendency to generalise illness least to plants out of the five 
biological categories would suggest that the status of plants in children’s biological 
understanding is different from that of animals.  
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     These findings suggest that children’s understanding of illness is underpinned by an 
awareness of the different categories of entities which exist in the world, and that children are 
able to make systematic predictions about entities’ susceptibility to illness based upon their 
knowledge of these categories from the age of 5. 
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Table 1: Child Exemplar: children’s mean responses to who can get plinkitis (standard 
deviations in parentheses) 
 
 Can get plinkitis 
Category 
Young Middle Old Total 
human beings 4.57 (0.9) 4.65 (0.7) 4.20 (1.5) 4.49 (1.1) 
mammals 1.70 (1.8) 2.10 (1.9) 2.75 (2.0) 2.11 (1.9) 
non-mammals 1.30 (1.6) 1.00 (1.4) 1.90 (1.8) 1.39 (1.6) 
birds 1.40 (1.5) 1.55 (1.8) 2.40 (2.1) 1.73 (1.8) 
plants 0.47 (0.6) 1.05 (1.6) 0.35 (0.9) 0.60 (1.1) 
artifacts 0.13 (0.7) 0.15 (0.4) 0.05 (0.2) 0.11 (0.5) 
mean scores    1.59                   1.75                  1.94                  1.73 
ANOVA 
 
category: F (5, 60) = 121.68, p< 0.0005 
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Table 2: Dog Exemplar: children’s mean responses to who can get plinkitis (standard 
deviations in parentheses) 
 
 Can get plinkitis 
Category 
Young Middle Old Total 
human beings 2.20 (2.3) 2.50 (2.5) 2.15 (2.4) 2.27 (2.3) 
mammals 3.40 (1.5) 4.10 (1.1) 3.90 (1.2) 3.74 (1.3) 
non-mammals 2.63 (1.7) 2.39 (1.5) 1.55 (1.6) 2.23 (1.7) 
birds 2.67 (1.7) 3.00 (1.6) 2.95 (1.9) 2.87 (1.7) 
plants 0.70 (0.9) 0.05 (0.2) 0.25 (1.1) 0.46 (0.9) 
artifacts 0.23 (0.6) 0.00 (0.0) 0.00 (0.0) 0.10 (0.4) 
mean scores    1.97                  2.00                  1.80                  1.94 
ANOVA 
 
category: F (5, 60) = 88.39, p< 0.0005 
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Table 3: Duck Exemplar: children’s mean responses to who can get plinkitis (standard 
deviations in parentheses) 
 
 Can get plinkitis 
Category 
Young Middle Old Total 
human beings 2.07 (2.0) 2.65 (2.4) 2.80 (2.2) 2.44 (2.2) 
mammals 2.60 (2.0) 3.15 (1.7) 2.60 (1.9) 2.76 (1.9) 
non-mammals 2.57 (1.6) 2.85 (1.6) 2.35 (1.7) 2.59 (1.6) 
birds 2.87 (1.8) 4.25 (1.0) 4.50 (0.7) 3.73 (1.4) 
plants 0.87 (1.1) 1.10 (1.8) 0.35 (1.1) 0.79 (1.3) 
artifacts 0.17 (0.5) 0.00 (0.0) 0.00 (0.0) 0.07 (0.3) 
mean scores   1.85                   2.33                  2.10                  2.06 
ANOVA 
 
category: F (5, 60) = 99.31, p< 0.0005 
age x category: F (10, 118) = 3.21, p< 0.01 
 
Scheffe tests: significant differences between age groups 
Bird category: 
Young group vs Middle group (p< 0.005) 
Young group vs Old group (p< 0.005) 
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Table 4: Rosebush Exemplar: children’s mean responses to who can get plinkitis (standard 
deviations in parentheses) 
 
 Can get plinkitis 
Category 
Young Middle Old Total 
human beings 2.37 (2.3) 2.50 (2.3) 1.85 (2.3) 2.26 (2.3) 
mammals 1.93 (1.8) 2.25 (2.0) 2.40 (1.9) 2.16 (1.9) 
non-mammals 1.73 (1.7) 2.40 (1.9) 1.80 (1.5) 1.94 (1.7) 
birds 1.77 (1.9) 2.35 (1.8) 2.55 (2.0) 2.16 (1.9) 
plants 3.70 (1.5) 3.70 (1.5) 4.95 (0.2) 4.06 (1.4) 
artifacts 0.13 (0.4) 0.25 (1.1) 0.05 (0.2) 0.14 (0.6) 
mean scores     1.93                    2.24                    2.26                    2.12 
ANOVA 
 
category: F (5, 60) = 121.68, p< 0.0005 
age x category: F (10, 118) = 2.57, p< 0.05 
 
Scheffe tests: significant differences between age groups 
Plant category: 
Old group vs Young group (p< 0.01) 
Old group vs Middle group (p< 0.05) 
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Table 5: Post hoc t-tests (Bonferroni corrected) to locate differences between ontological 
categories by exemplar for can get plinkitis 
 
 
Child 
(t values) 
Dog 
(t values) 
Duck 
(t values) 
Rosebush 
(t values) 
humans v mammals 9.41** -4.76** ns ns 
humans v non-mammals 12.96** ns ns ns 
humans v plants 20.52** 6.26** 5.68** -5.45** 
humans v birds 11.08** ns -4.90** ns 
humans v artifacts 26.21** 7.50**         8.68**         7.54** 
mammals v non-mammals 5.28** 7.60** ns ns 
mammals v plants 6.66** 16.02** 7.83** -6.84** 
mammals v birds 3.76** 5.65** -3.96** ns 
mammals v artifacts 8.07** 21.24** 11.50** 9.01** 
non-mammals v plants 3.90** 8.64** 8.29** -8.07** 
non-mammals v birds ns ns -5.14** ns 
non-mammals v artifacts 6.22** 10.68** 12.43** 8.95** 
plants v birds 5.24** 10.25** 13.37** -6.82** 
plants v artifacts 3.35** ns 4.31** 21.14** 
birds v artifacts 6.92** 12.92** 18.85** 8.63** 
 
df = 69 
p < 0.003** ns = non-significant 
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Table 6: Configural Frequency Analysis response patterns by exemplar (Bonferroni corrected)  
Exemplar Pattern Frequency Z score 
1 0 0 0 0 0 37 34.6 ** 
1 1 1 1 0 0 9 7.6** 
Child 
1 1 0 1 0 0 9 7.6** 
1 1 1 1 0 0 13 11.5** 
0 1 1 1 0 0 11 9.5** 
0 1 0 1 0 0 10 8.6** 
0 1 0 0 0 0 8 6.7** 
Dog 
1 1 0 0 0 0 7 5.7** 
1 1 1 1 0 0 12 10.5** 
0 0 0 1 0 0 10 8.6** 
0 1 1 1 0 0 7 5.7** 
0 0 0 0 0 0 7 5.7** 
1 0 0 1 0 0 5 3.8** 
1 1 1 0 0 0 5 3.8** 
Duck 
1 1 1 1 1 0 5 3.8** 
0 0 0 0 1 0 20 18.2** 
1 1 1 1 1 0 7 5.7** 
1 0 0 0 1 0 6 4.7** 
Rosebush 
0 1 1 1 1 0 5 3.8** 
 
p < 0.0008** 
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